News Digest — 7/15/24
Biden To Meet With Netanyahu At White House On July 22nd
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will meet US President Joe Biden in Washington on July 22nd, two days ahead of the premier’s speech before a joint session of Congress, an Israeli official told The Times of Israel on Sunday (14th).
The meeting will take place in the White House, said the official.
This will be the first time Biden has hosted Netanyahu in Washington since the premier’s latest term began in late 2022. The White House had already indicated that the two leaders would most likely meet when Netanyahu is in Washington.
“The president has known Prime Minister Netanyahu for three decades. They will likely see each other when the prime minister is here over the course of the week, but we have nothing further to announce at this time,” a White House official told The Times Of Israel.
Netanyahu is slated to take off from Israel on July 22, and return from the US three days later.
Netanyahu last met with Biden when the president traveled to Israel days after Hamas’ October 7 terror onslaught. They also met in the US two weeks before the attack, but the administration chose to hold the sit-down on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York and not at the White House.
Biden had hesitated to embrace the prime minister, who formed a coalition with far-right lawmakers that have advanced a series of policies opposed by the US.
Netanyahu’s July 24 speech before Congress may not be attended by some Democrats who have criticized Israel’s military operations in Gaza.
The invitation from House Speaker Mike Johnson, a Louisiana Republican, to Netanyahu came after consultation with the White House, according to a person familiar with the matter who was granted anonymity to discuss the sensitive subject.
The American Congress has usually displayed a ceremonial, bipartisan show of support to Israel, its greatest ally, and has welcomed Israeli leaders to its chambers.
Ramming Attack In Nir Zvi Junction, Several Wounded
Four people were wounded in a ramming attack at the Nir Zvi Junction near Ramle on Sunday (14th).
Police reported that the terrorist was apprehended by border police officers in the reserves.
The IDF later said that the victims were military men. An officer and an additional soldier were seriously wounded while two other soldiers sustained moderate and light wounds.
District police officer Avi Biton said at the scene that the terrorist “carried out a ramming attack against several Israelis at a bus stop. He then continued a few hundred meters, turned around, and struck at the bus stop again.” he added that the terrorist was “probably
From east Jerusalem, and that “it is our job to figure out if he was working alone,” or if he had accomplices.
Police Chief Kobi Shabtai, said that police had been on heightened alert since Saturday (13th) when a strike was carried out by Israel against Mohammad Deif, the commander of Hamas’ military wing who has been wanted by Israel for three decades.
The soldiers were evacuated to receive medical treatment at the hospital. And their families were notified. Earlier, Magen David Adom said its paramedics provided medical care and transferred to the Shamir Medical Center three individuals who had been wounded.
Border police commander, IDF Maj.-Gen. Itzhak Brik arrived at the scene of the attack where he received an overview from the reserve soldiers, and praised their work, police said.
“Professional work, truly worthy of praise. This neutralization was very important. We are in a very challenging time with quite a few alerts,” he said.
He added: “You did a professional and serious job; you have full backing for this activity. Congratulations to you. You have proven time and time again that the reserve system of the police and border guards of this high quality, strengthens the police.”
Israel Targets Architect Of Oct. 7 In Airstrike – Ronen Bergman
Israel conducted an airstrike in southern Gaza on Saturday (13th), targeting Mohammed Deif, the leader of the Qassam Brigade, Hamas’ military wing, and one of the architects of the Oct. 7 attack on Israel. He is the second-most senior Hamas figure in Gaza after Yahya Sinwar. Rafah Salameh, the leader of Hamas forces in Khan Younis, was also targeted in the attack. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said Saturday night (13th) that their deaths had not yet been confirmed.
The Israeli military and the Israel Security Agency said the strike hit “an open area surrounded by trees, several buildings and sheds,” and posted an aerial photograph of a plot of land filled with palm trees and a few houses. Israeli officials said Deif was targeted while he was inside a fenced Hamas-run compound that was not used as a camp for displaced people.
Deif has been one of Israel’s most wanted men for decades. He is revered by some Palestinians for overseeing the development of Hamas’ military capabilities. Michael Milshtein, a former Israeli intelligence officer, described Deif as “the beating heart of Hamas’ military wing. “Deif also commanded the Hamas forces guarding the Israeli captives.
Chief Of Staff Halevi: Hamas Is Trying To Hide ‘Results of Strike On Mohammed Deif
Chief of Staff Halevi, while delivering a situational assessment, commented on the strike that killed Rafah Salameh, commander of the Khan Younis Brigade, which was confirmed earlier on Sunday (14th).
The IDF Chief of Staff delivered the assessment at the Palmachim Air Force base on Sunday (14th), where he spoke of the Saturday (13th) IDF strike on a compound where Mohanned Deif was located.
Yesterday, in a joint operation by the IDF and Shin Bet, we attacked a compound in Khan Younis where Mohammed Deif, the commander of the military wing of Hamas, was hiding – the man who planned and gave the order for the October 7 attack.”
Halevi noted that the strike killed Rafah Salameh, commander of the Khan Younis Brigade, which was confirmed on Sunday (14th) by the IDF.
The IDF Chief of Staff also stated that according to intelligence assessments, there were no hostages in the compound.
“It is still too early to summarize the results of the attack, which Hamas is trying to hide. We are determined to continue hunting-down senior Hamas officials, those who planned and carried out the massacre on Oct. 7,” said Halevi.
“Mohammed Deif was afraid to die, so he hid in a way that even action was in his power to control. He hid and sacrificed his men with him, including civilians around him who were in danger,” Halevi said.
How The IDF IS Using Lessons From Gaza To Teach The US How To Minimize Its Casualties – Anshel Pfeffer
The IDF Medical Corps was properly prepared for the war which began on Oct.7. IDF Surgeon General Brig.-Gen. Prof. Elon Glassberg, who last week ended a four-year term encompassing a war and a pandemic, said his doctors and paramedics who served inside the combat zone in Gaza are measured by one metric – CFR (case fatality rate) – the percentage of wounded soldiers evacuated from the battlefield who they failed to save. In the Second Lebanon War in 2006, the CFR stood at 15%. In the Gaza War, the CFR was down to 6.5%
Glassberg explained the reasons for this. “We were much more aggressive in deploying doctors and paramedics in the field. Most militaries usually have a senior medical figure at battalion level. In Gaza we deployed them also at company level, which meant that within minutes of a soldier being wounded they were being treated by a serious professional in the field.”
“Then we streamlined the evacuation process, changing centuries of military medical practice by eliminating the battalion aid station as the hub of treatment, and instead putting more focus on the initial treatment followed by immediate evacuation by helicopter or armored vehicles to the border and then home. Third, we developed both powdered plasma and ‘whole blood’ transfusions which can be used in the field and have been proven to save lives.”
Glassberg is now off to Washington to work with American military medical experts on sharing the IDF’s experience from this war. (Jewish Chronicle-UK)
To Prevent Hamas’ Resurgence, Israel Must Maintain Grip On Philadelphi Corridor – Meir Ben Shabbat
Could an Israeli-Egyptian mechanism, with US involvement, effectively replace direct Israeli control? Historical precedent offers little room for optimism.
To prevent Hamas’ resurgence Israel must stay on in the Philadelphi Corridor.
Israel’s grip on the Philadelphi Corridor stands out as one of its key strategic gains in the Gaza War. This control serves a dual purpose: it provides leverage in hostage release negotiations and, more critically, acts as a bulwark against Hamas’ potential resurgence. The move reflects a hard-learned lesson from Israel’s two-decade struggle to contain military buildup in Gaza. Past reliance on international arrangements as a security substitute has proven ineffective, with little reason to believe such measures would fare better in the future. Moreover, acquiescing to these arrangements could embolden Hamas, fostering hope that post-conflict Gaza might revert to its pre-Oct 7 status quo.
The flurry of updates on hostage deal negotiations and ongoing Gaza operations has overshadowed recent reports suggesting Israel’s potential withdrawal from the Philadelphi Corridor. However, the question of who controls this strategic strip could prove decisive in determining the lasting impact of Israel’s war efforts. The extent of control over this route will not only influence how quickly adversaries could pose renewed threats to Israel but also shape the nature and intensity of future security challenges. One need look no farther than Hezbollah’s daily provocations for a glimpse of potential scenarios absent effective control.
Drawing from its Gaza experience, Israel has emphasized that any future political settlement must include Israel’s control over the external border areas. This stance, initially articulated regarding arrangements with the Palestinian Authority, holds even truer for Gaza in the absence of a formal arrangement. The devastating toll of Oct. 7 has lent legitimacy to this position, while the war has created the operational conditions to make it feasible. However, relinquishing this control would be irreversible. Israel would be hard-pressed to reclaim the area after making commitments to Egypt and the US, especially within the context of broader international understandings.
Could an Israeli-Egyptian mechanism, with US involvement, effectively replace direct Israeli control? Historical precedent offers little room for optimism. In Jan. 2009, as Operation Cast Lead wound down, then-Foreign Affairs Minister Tzipi Livni signed an agreement establishing such a mechanism. While this accord halted Israel’s military campaign short of decisively defeating Hamas, it failed to prevent even a single instance of smuggling.
This wasn’t without precedent. In Oct. 2005, at the urging of US officials, Israel agreed to regulate the opening of Gaza border crossings. Promises of assistance in countering resulting security threats proved hollow. The PA lost its foothold in Gaza, Israeli security assurances evaporated, and Hamas celebrated the perceived folly of the arrangement.
Any reasonable person understands that detection and monitoring systems alone can’t stop smuggling. An effective operational force is crucial – capable of swift, timely responses to incidents. Without Israeli control, we would be dependent on the goodwill of the Egyptians. Their priorities and considerations may not align perfectly with Israeli security imperatives. The likelihood of such a mechanism meeting Israel’s expectations is far lower than the probability of smuggling along this route becoming a flashpoint in Israeli-Egyptian relations.
Undoubtedly, Israeli control of the Philadelphi Corridor presents complex operational, diplomatic, and logistical challenges. However, these must be weighed against the costs of relinquishing control. The current climate provides unprecedented justification for implementing necessary engineering measures to enhance the security of Israeli forces in the area.
While Israeli control of the Philadelphi Corridor may not be the ideal from all perspectives, it represents a vital course correction. It embodies the principle of self-reliance in defense, deprives a significant strategic asset of those responsible for the Oct. 7 atrocities, and marks a substantial step toward reshaping Gaza’’s future security landscape.
