News Digest — 7/16/24
Hezbollah Responds: 20 Rockets Fired Towards Kiryat Shmona
A barrage of 20 rockets was fired on Monday evening (15th) by Hezbollah from Lebanon towards Kiryat Shmona and the surrounding area.
Most of the rockets were intercepted and no injuries were reported.
The barrage follows an attack by an Israeli aircraft on a car in Syrian territory, near the Lebanese border on Monday afternoon (15th).
According to reports in Syria, the attack targeted and eliminated businessman Muhammad Bara’a al-Katarji, who was close to the Assad regime and was a Hezbollah commander. The eliminated man also was a money changer who helped finance Hezbollah and other organizations in the region.
According to reports in Syria, he was one of the most important businessmen associated with President Bashar Al-Assad’s regime.
The strike took place in an area close to Syria’s border with Lebanon on the same road where Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah’s former bodyguard was killed.
Three Israelis Lightly Injured In Shooting Attack near West Bank Town Of Bayt Lid
Three Israelis were lightly wounded in a suspected shooting attack in the West Bank town of Bayt Lid authorities said Tuesday morning (16th).
The three victims were hurt by glass shards after their vehicle came under fire, a military official said.
The IDF launched a manhunt for the assailants.
The Magen David Adom ambulance service reported three people, aged 32, 16, and 15, were lightly injured by flying glass, treated at the scene and then taken to Meir Medical Center in Kfar Saba.
MDA reported the victims said they heard eight or nine shots but didn’t see the shooter.
The Bayt Lid shooting came after four IDF soldiers were wounded Sunday (14th), two of them seriously, in a car-ramming attack at a junction in central Israel.
According to police, the terrorist, identified as a Palestinian man from East Jerusalem, rammed his car into people waiting at a bus station at the Nir Tzvi junction.
The intersection, outside the town of the same name, is adjacent to the IDF’s Tzrifin Base.
The four victims were taken to the nearby Asaf Harofeh Hospital, which said it treated a soldier and an officer in serious condition, another soldier in moderate condition, and a cadet who was slightly hurt.
The suspected terrorist was shot dead at the scene by Border Police officers who were stationed in the area.
Tensions in Israel and the West Bank have soared since October 7, when terrorists burst through the Gaza border into Israel in a Hamas-led attack, killing some 1,200 people and seizing some 252 hostages.
Since then, 22 Israelis, including security personnel, have been killed in Palestinian terror attacks in Israel and the West Bank (Judea and Samaria), including five members of security forces killed in clashes with terror operatives.
Hamas Remains The Dominant Power In Palestinians’ Minds – Khaled Abu Toameh
More than nine months after the Israel-Hamas war began, many Palestinians are convinced that the “day after” in Gaza will be a return to the pre-Oct. 7 era, in which the Iran-backed terrorist group still has control. Today, Palestinians fall into two groups: those who hate Hamas but think that, under the current circumstances, it is impossible to remove it from power, and those who want Hamas to stay in power because they embrace it and its extremist ideology.
One Palestinian Authority official said that he had anticipated a fall in Hamas’ popularity among the Palestinians as the war dragged on and more Palestinians lost their lives. “We see that the opposite has happened,” he said. “According to polls conducted after Oct. 7, Hamas’ popularity is rising. This is due to the widespread belief that Hamas is winning the battle. If you watched Al Jazeera, you would also come to the same conclusion – that Israel has been defeated.”
According to the latest poll, a vast majority of Palestinians (68%) said the terrorist group’s decision to launch a war on Israel was “correct.” There is virtually little debate among the Palestinians about the “day after” in Gaza. This is due to the widespread Palestinian belief that Hamas will somehow maintain its hold on power in Gaza after the war.
The writer, a veteran Israeli journalist, is a senior fellow at the Jerusalem Center. (Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs)
(jcpa.org)
‘A Kingdom Divided:’ The Discord Within Hamas’ Fragmenting Leadership
Internal divisions in Hamas are evident as Hamas redefines its relationship with the Palestinian Liberation Organization and looks for a new home.
After nine months of war, the Hamas leadership is fragmenting as internal conflicts and airstrikes on key figures take a toll.
Intense pressure from the Israeli military, compounded by Qatar’s political pressure and American economic pressure have triggered a series of developments indicating significant shifts in the structure and behavior of Hamas’ military leadership.
With the majority of Hamas’ military council killed in airstrikes, the terror group has begun appointing new leaders and making succession plans to replace other figures viewed as at risk.
But this comes against the backdrop of long-standing rifts between Hamas’ Iranian and Qatari camps.
If the death of Mohammed Deif is confirmed – he was targeted in an airstrike on Saturday (13th) – Mohammed Sinwar, brother of Yahya Sinwar, is poised to become leader of Hamas’ military forces.
Furthermore, Arab sources report that Ruhi Mushtaha, a close associate of Yahya Sinwar from their time in Israeli prison, is likely to succeed Sinwar as Hamas’ Gaza strongman.
Senior commanders eliminated so far include Marwan Issa (Hamas’ No. 3 man) and Salah Arouri (key strategist who directed terror operations in Judea and Samaria), Ahmed Ehandor (commander of the Northern Division), Iman Nofal (commander of Central Gaza Brigade) among others, and more recently Rafah Salameh (commander of the Khan Yunis Brigade.)
The fate of Raed Saad (head of the operations division in Gaza) remains unknown after he was targeted in an airstrike in June.
Internal divisions are also evident as Hamas redefines its relationship with the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and looks for a new home.
Leaders such as Ismail Haniyeh have met with Fatah and PLO representatives, discussing the possibility of Hamas joining a unified leadership or the PLO.
These talks have sparked significant internal discord, particularly from Sinwar, who opposes such negotiations.
Despite his opposition, senior officials like Khaled Mashal and Musa Abu Marzouk continue to advocate for Hamas’ integration into broader Palestinian politics.
Hamas’ deputy leader and politburo member Khalil al-Hayah, hinted at a potential disarmament and transition to a political party, should a Palestinian state be established.
Sinwar demonstrated his disregard for the Hamas leadership in Qatar when Doha had to send a special envoy to communicate with him during the first truce for the release of Israeli hostages.
Haniyeh and other top leaders based in Qatar have repeatedly been unable to influence Sinwar’s decisions.
Sinwar has also prohibited the Hamas leadership abroad from discussing the future of Gaza and expressed strong disapproval of Haniyeh’s meetings with representatives of exiled Palestinian figure Mohammed Dahlan, who may be interested in returning to Gaza to play a key role in governing the Strip.
In another strategic move, Hamas is attempting to open a political office in Damascus, a process initiated by the late Salah Arouri.
The initiative could heighten internal conflicts, as this will likely strain Hamas’ relations with both the Muslim Brotherhood and Qatar.
The significant split within Hamas, described by Arab commentators as the ‘divided kingdom’ or the ‘broken emirate.’ began years ago and persists.
This internal conflict continued even as Hamas aligned with Iran and lost the support of the moderate Sunni Arab world. Currently, Hamas operates under two primary leaderships: the military leadership in Gaza and the political leadership abroad.
At least 1,200 people were killed , and 252 Israelis and foreigners were taken hostage in Hamas’ attacks on Israeli communities near the Gaza border on October 7 2023 – of the 116 remaining hostages more than 30 are believed dead.
Iran Building Jihadi Proxy Armies To Stretch Israel’s Air Defense
The use of UAVs by Iranian-backed militias is part of a broader strategy to exploit asymmetrical warfare techniques and keep Israeli air defenses busy.
Iranian-backed Shiite terrorist militias in Syria and Iraq are constantly using long-range unmanned aerial vehicles to target Israel’s Red Sea city of Eilat on a regular basis.
These UAVs launched from bases in areas where Iran has entrenched itself, represent a persistent threat to Israeli security and will require more than defensive action to neutralize.
On Saturday (13th), two UAVs approached the area north of Eilat from Syrian territory. The Israel Defense Forces intercepted the drones before they could inflict any damage, according to the military.
In retaliation, the IDF launched strikes overnight Sunday (14th) against a Syrian military command center and infrastructure sites, including targets used by the Syrian military’s Aerial Defense Unit.
It is possible that the sites hit by Israel in Syria were also used by Hezbollah, which has for years entrenched itself within Syrian military positions near Israel.
Israel’s policy of holding the Syrian regime accountable for all terrorist attacks emanating from its territory is logical but will not actually remove the threatening capabilities. Only Israeli strikes on the Shiite terrorist entities themselves in Syria and Iraq will do that.
Iran has been activating its militias in Syria and Iraq against Israel, as well as the Houthis in Yemen, since the start of the current war, as part of a multi-front assault.
On March 31, a UAV launched from Iraq entered Israeli airspace via Jordan and caused light damage to a naval base building in Eilat. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed responsibility for that attack, describing it as a strike on a “vital target” in Israel.
This is all happening as Iran’s chief regional terrorist army, Hezbollah, rains down UAVs, rockets and anti-tank missiles on northern Israel, and absorbs Israeli fire in response.
UAVs provide Iranian proxies with a low cost, high-impact means of striking targets within Israel. They often fly at low altitude to try and evade detection by radar systems, and travel long distances, as was the case in the September 2019 attack on two major Saudi oil installations.
That attack involved UAVs fired, according to American assessments, from Iran, and traveling long and indirect routes to their targets in Saudi Arabia.
The Houthis later claimed responsibility for those attacks, likely to try and cover up Iran’s decision to launch the drones itself.
The latest drone attacks from Syria and Iraq indicate a coordinated Iranian effort to create a multi-front threat against Israel, one that, without a direct offensive response, will only grow, irrespective of the nature of the Syrian regime’s complicity, whether active or passive.
Iranian terrorist militias, equipped with increasingly sophisticated UAV technology provided by Iranian defense industries, pose a direct threat not only to Israel but to Sunni Arab countries as well, including Jordan and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).
The IDF’s interception of the UAVs near Eilat demonstrates the effectiveness of Israel’s world-leading multi-layered air defense systems, which include the Iron Dome, David’s Sling and Arrow systems.
Israel may have to adopt new capabilities as well, such as a radar-guided cannon, to help take on larger drone swarms, which appears to be only a matter of time.
The new Israeli Iron Beam cannons can provide a valuable and cheap layer of local defense.
But Israel cannot disregard the need for consistent offense.
In Syria, Iran maintains thousands of Shiite terrorists as it tries to build a new army there, such as the Fatemiyoun Brigade, Afghan Shiite Militia, the Zainebiyoun Brigade and Pakistani Shiite Militia.
These forces are equipped, trained, and actively directed by the Quds Force of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps.
Meanwhile, it is the IRGC’s own Aerospace Force that fires drones and missiles directly from Iranian territory, including at Israel on April 14 this year and during the 2019 attack on Saudi Arabia.
The Islamic Resistance in Iraq, which said it was behind the March 31 Eilat attack, is an umbrella organization composed of several Iranian-backed Shiite militias, including Kata’ib Hezbollah, Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba and Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhadaa.
These groups operate both in Iraq and Syria under IRGC command.
The build-up of these militias has accelerated in recent years, even as reports of occasional airstrikes against them have surfaced.
